Abstract-This paper studies rateless network error correction codes for reliable multicast in the presence of adversarial errors. We present rateless coding schemes for two adversarial models, where the source sends more redundancy over time, until decoding succeeds. The first model assumes there is a secret channel between the source and the destination that the adversaries cannot overhear. The rate of the channel is negligible compared to the main network. In the second model the source and destination share random secrets independent of the input information. The amount of secret information required is negligible compared to the amount of information sent. Both schemes are capacity optimal, distributed, polynomial-time and end-to-end in that other than the source and destination nodes, other intermediate nodes carry out classical random linear network coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Comparing with routing, network coding is more vulnerable to attack by malicious adversaries that inject corrupted packets, since corrupted packets are mixed with other packets in the network. The use of coding to correct such errors information theoretically is studied by [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] . Most existing schemes assume a given min cut (capacity) of the network and maximum number of adversarial errors for the purposes of code design and encoding. However such an assumption may be overly restrictive in many practical settings. This paper proposes rateless network error correction codes that do not require a priori estimates of the network capacity and number of errors. The source transmits redundancy incrementally until decoding succeeds. The supply of encoded packets is potentially limitless and the number of encoded packets actually transmitted is determined by the number of errors that occur. A number of related works e.g. [6] , [7] , [8] propose cryptographic schemes that can be used to detect and remove errors in rateless network codes, while [9] proposes a rateless network error correction scheme that requires cryptographic means of verifying successful decoding. In contrast, our work presents the first completely information-theoretic rateless network error correction codes.
We design two algorithms targeting different network models. In the first model, also studied in [4] , there is a secret channel between the source and the destination that is hidden from the adversary (who is omniscient except for the secret), and the rate of the channel is negligible compared to the network. In this case over time we incrementally send more linearly dependent redundancy of the source message through the network to combat erasures, and incrementally send more (linearly independent) short hashes of the message on the secret channel to eliminate fake information. The destination amasses both kinds of redundancy until he decodes successfully. The code will adapt to the actual min cut of the network as well as the number of errors.
The second scenario is the random secret model [5] , where instead of a secret channel, the source and destination share a "small" fixed random secret that is independent of the input message. The amount of secrets required is again negligible compared to the amount of information sent. Compared to the secret channel model, the challenge is that both linearly dependent and independent redundancy must be sent over the public and unreliable network. Again, we propose codes that will adapt to the network and adversary parameters.
Both schemes are distributed with polynomial-time complexity of design and implementation. They assume no knowledge of the topology and work in both wired and wireless networks. Moreover, implementation involves only slightly modifying the source encoder and destination decoder, while internal nodes use standard random linear network coding.
II. NETWORK MODELS

A. Adversary Model
The source Alice wishes to communicate reliably with the destination Bob over a general network, where there is a hidden attacker Calvin who wants to disrupt the communication. Calvin is assumed to be able to observe all the transmissions over the network, and know the encoding and decoding schemes at all nodes. Calvin can corrupt transmitted packets or inject erroneous packets. Finally, we assume Calvin to be computationally unbounded. In this paper we discuss two models that limit Calvin's knowledge. For the first model, in addition to the given network, there is a secret channel between Alice and Bob. Information transmitted on this channel cannot be observed or modified by Calvin [4] . However, the rate of the channel is negligible compared to the network. In the second model, we assume the source and destination share a small amount of random secret information that is independent with the input information [5] . Again, the amount of secret information required is negligible compared to the amount of information sent.
B. Network Model
We model the network as a hypergraph where nodes are vertices and hyperedges are directed from the transmitting nodes to the set of the receiving nodes. Let E be the set of 978-1-4673-5946-7/13/$31.00 ©2013 IEEE 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2 hyperedges and T be the set of nodes. Alice and Bob are not assumed to know the capacity of the network as well as the number of errors that the adversary can inject.
Alice encodes her information bits into a batch of b packets by the encoding schemes described in subsequent sections. Each packet contains a sequence of n + b symbols from the finite field F q . Let matrix X 0 = F b×(n+b) q represent one batch of packets from Alice. We call the communication of one batch of information bits X 0 a session. In the rateless setting, a session may require multiple network transmissions until Bob receives enough redundancy to decode correctly. Assume in general that a session involves N stages, i.e., N uses of the network. During the i-th stage, denote the capacity (min cut from Alice to Bob) of the network as M i , and the number of errors (min cut from Calvin to Bob) that the adversary injects as z i . We assume z i < M i , otherwise the network is completely filled with errors. For any realistic network, M i is always bounded. For example, let c i be the number of transmission opportunities at the source during the i-th stage, then M i ≤ c i . For convenience we further assume c i ≤c, ∀i.
III. CODE CONSTRUCTION FOR SECRET CHANNEL MODEL A. Encoder
Alice's encoder has a structure similar to [4] , but operates in a rateless manner. In each session Alice transmits nb incompressible information symbols from F q to Bob. Alice arranges them into a matrix W ∈ F and encodes X 1 = K 1 X 0 . X 1 is then sent over a network where intermediate nodes implement random linear coding. In addition, Alice sends a hash of the message through the secret channel. She sets α 1 = bc 1 , and draws random symbols r 1 , ..., r α1+1 independently and uniformly from F q . Note that the {r j } are drawn secretly so that Calvin cannot observe them. Let
k , and the hash is computed as H 1 = X 0 D 1 . Finally Alice sends r 1 , ..., r α1+1 and H 1 to Bob through the secret channel. The size of the secret is (α 1 + 1)(b + 1), which is asymptotically negligible in n.
Alice keeps sending more redundant information to Bob as follows. For the i-th stage, i ≥ 2, Alice draws a random matrix
, encodes X i = K i X 0 , and sends X i over the network. In addition, Alice again draws r 1 , ..., r αi randomly from F q secretly, where
and computes
Alice eventually sends r 1 , ..., r αi and H i to Bob through the secret channel. The size of the secret is α i (b + 1), again asymptotically negligible in n. Note that the secret sent in the first stage is slightly longer in order to guarantee message integrity. Alice repeats this procedure until Bob indicates decoding success. If a success is indicated, Alice ends the current session and moves onto the next session.
B. Decoder
The network performs a classical distributed network code. Specifically, each packet transmitted by an intermediate node is a random linear combination of its incoming packets. For the i-th stage, we can describe this linear relation as
where
represents the errors injected by Calvin, and T i and Q i are defined to be the transfer matrix from Alice to Bob and from Calvin to Bob, respectively. By stacking all the batches of observations received by the i-th stage, let
and
Then we have
where (1) follows from the network transform, and (2) follows from the code construction. Note that only
and H (i) are available to Bob, and he needs to recover X 0 from equations (1), (2) . To decode, Bob first solve for X s from
If (3) has a unique solution, Bob reconstructs X 0 as following
Otherwise, as will be shown later, with high probability there is no solution for (3), and Bob waits to receive more redundancy.
C. Performance
In the following we show that the probability of error vanishes as q → ∞. The following Lemma 1 validates that with high probability 1 there exists X s such that (4) holds.
(i) has full column rank with high probability.
Proof Sketch:
has full column rank. So T (i) has full column rank. Without loss of generality we assume Q (i) also has full column rank. Finally by [10] 
M j , the probability that the column spans of T (i) and Q (i) intersects except for the zero vector is upper bounded by i 2 |T ||E|q −1 → 0. Refer to [11] for the details of proof. Lemma 2: For any X = X 0 , the probability that X D
It is equivalent to consider the probability that (X − X 0 )D (i) = 0. Since X − X 0 = 0, there is at least one 3 row in which X differs from X 0 . Denote this row of X −X 0 as (x 1 , ..., x n+b ), then the j-th entry of the corresponding row of
is not the zero polynomial, the probability (over r j ) that F (r j ) = 0 is at most (n+b)/q. Because D (i) has i k=1 α k +1 columns, and all r j , 1 ≤ j ≤ i k=1 α k + 1, are independently chosen, the probability that the entire row is a zero vector is at most ((n + b)/q) i k=1 α k +1 . This is an upper bound on the probability that the entire matrix (X − X 0 )D (i) is zero. Using Lemma 2 and taking the union bound over V s we have: Lemma 3: The probability that there exists Theorem 1 shows that the code is optimal in that decoding succeeds with high probability whenever the total amount of information received by the sink satisfies the necessary cut set bound, b
The computational cost of design, encoding, and decoding is dominated by the cost of the matrix multiplication
, which is O(n(ic) 3 ). Details about efficient implementation are available in [11] .
IV. CODE CONSTRUCTION FOR RANDOM SECRET MODEL
In this section we assume Alice and Bob share a random secrets whose size is asymptotically negligible compared to the amount of information sent. The shared random secret is assumed to be independent with the source message X 0 . Comparing to the previous secret channel model, the random secret model is more challenging because the hashes cannot be computed straightforwardly as in (2), and they must be sent through the public and unreliable network.
The vectorization of a matrix is a linear transformation which converts the matrix into a column vector by stacking the columns of the matrix on top of one another. Let column vector w ∈ F bn q be the vectorized W . To generate hashes, i.e., linearly independent redundancy that is transmitted at the k-th stage, we first draw α k symbols from the random shared secrets as d
α k ∈ F q , and use them to construct the α k ×nb parity check matrix
T from the random shared secrets and enforce the following parity check relation:
where I α k is the identity matrix of dimension α k and l k is a vector of length α k that can be solved for uniquely. So we have a rateless parity check scheme based on (5):
i.e., the total number of parity checks i α i can grow over time if necessary.
A. Encoder
In order for Bob to decode successfully, both linearly dependent redundancy and linearly independent redundancy are required. Linearly dependent redundancy corresponds to long messages that lie in the row space of X 0 , while the linearly independent redundancy are short hashes with size independent of n. Therefore, it is convenient and efficient to encode and send the two kinds of redundancy separately as long packets and short packets, respectively. We define M i , z i , c i ,c for long packets as described in Section II. For short packets, denoteM i ,c i andz i as the min cut from Alice to Bob, the number of available transmission opportunities, and the min cut from Calvin to Bob at stage i, respectively. Similarly we assumez i <M i , ∀i.
The source message is arranged as a b × n matrix W . Then we let X 0 = (W I b ). At the i-th stage, Alice draws a random matrix
, and encodes the long packets
To generate the linearly independent redundancy, Alice may choose any σ such that σ ≤M i −z i , ∀i (e.g., σ = 1 is a safe choice) and m such that σm ≥ 2bc + 2σc + 1. At stage i Alice sets α i = iσm, solves for l i according to (5) , and arranges the column
where 0 D is a zero matrix of size σ×(i−j)m, and 0 j is the zero matrix of size σ×(j −1)σ. 0 D is dummy and is used to align L, and 0 j is used to align the identity matrix. Alice then draws a uniform random matrix G i of sizec i × iσ and encodes the short packets as
Note that the size of the secret, i(i+1)σm/2, is asymptotically negligible in n. Finally, at the i-th stage Alice sends X i as long packets and A i as short packets. Alice repeats this procedure until Bob decodes successfully.
B. Decoder
At stage i Bob receives long and short packets Y i and J i :
are the transfer matrices between Alice and Bob,
are the transfer matrices between Calvin and Bob, and
are the errors injected to long packets and short packets, respectively. Bob then stacks the long and short packets that he has received so far to get 
where F Z and F X are matrices of coefficients. Bob deals with J (i) in a similar way. Letr i be the rank of
be the last iσ columns of J (i) , and
] comprises a basis for the column space of J (i) , and we can write
Equations (9) and (10) characterize the effect of the network transform. To take into account the built-in redundancy of the message, ∀i, Bob splits X 0 and L (i) as:
where X 
Then Bob constructs two matrices B top and B mid as defined in (14) and (15) Bob tries to solve (16) and if there is a unique solution, Bob has decoded successfully with high probability. Otherwise, with high probability there is no solution and Bob waits to receive more redundancy.
C. Performance
The following Lemmas 4 and 5 establish (10) and (9) . The idea of their proofs is similar to Lemma 1.
Lemma 4:T (i) has full column rank with high probability. (i) has full column rank with high probability.
The following Lemmas 6 and 7 can be proved by standard matrix operations and by invoking Lemmas 4 and 5. We defer detail proofs to [11] due to space limit.
Lemma 6: With high probability (8) and (10) are equivalent to the following equation:
Lemma 7: If i j=1 M j − i j=1 z j ≥ b, then with high probability (7) and (9) are equivalent tô
Equations (6), (18), and (17) together imply:
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